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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited 
partnership. 
I md Appellant, 
vs. 
HOMESTEAD (,<>i.l- CI I ill INC.. 
CiERAI 1) R SANDERS, and t.Rl A 
INNSOl IH1 ROCKIES, INC., a 
Nc.nia corpomli-'ii, 
I • • d . - - i 
APl't LLLt.S BRIEF 
Case No 20020796-CA 
Prion* 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is within the origp •' urisdiction of the Utah Suprer\ 
to Utah Code Annotated. §78-2-2(3 K.iMsupp 2002j. The Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to this court pursuan. ... i tan I ode Annotated. §§78-2-2(4) and 78-2A-
^(2)(i)(supp.»l)<).,.l. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly deny leave to amend because the amendment 
was futile as the new claims that Pride attempted to assert were barred by res judicata? 
This issue is reviewed for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1989). 
2. Did the district court act within its discretion in denying Pride Stables' 
("Pride") motion for leave to amend its Complaint on the basis the motion was untimely 
and prejudicial? This issue is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Hill v. State 
Farm Mutual 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Was summary judgment properly granted dismissing Pride's' Complaint on the 
basis of res judicata and because there was no evidence to support the fraud claim? This 
decision is reviewed for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
4. Even if it is assumed for argument that res judicata does not bar all of Pride's 
claims in this action and that Pride had amended its Complaint, did the district court 
properly deny Prided motion for partial summary judgment because in that event there 
were questions of fact that would have to be decided with respect to the contract and 
promissory estoppel claims? This decision is reviewed de novo with all of the facts and 
2 
inferences to be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
in. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
All of Pride's claims in this action are dependent upon the existence of an 
agreement by Homestead Golf Club, Inc. ("HGC") to loan Pride $185,000.00 in 
consideration for a license to use Pride's land. After twelve years of litigation in federal 
court, the Tenth Circuit ruled no agreement existed because the parties had never agreed 
to the terms of a loan or license. The end results were that (1) HGC was not entitled to 
any license to use Pride's land; (2) HGC had to move the fourteenth hole off of Pride's 
land at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars; (3) Homestead, Inc. was required to 
spend $350,000.00 to purchase the land encumbered by Crossland Savings' Trust Deed in 
order to save the golf course instead of HGC receiving the use of that land free as HGC 
would have been entitled had an agreement been reached with Pride; and (4) HGC had no 
obligation to loan Pride any money. 
Pride likes the decision that HGC was not entitled to use Pride's land and wants to 
avail itself of the favorable portions of the federal court rulings, but is desperate to escape 
the ruling that is dispositive of the issues in this lawsuit - - that no agreement for a license 
or loan was ever made by the parties because they did not agree to the terms of a license 
3 
or loan. No matter how hard Pride tries to avoid that decision, the indisputable fact is 
that, as correctly determined by the district court, the Tenth Circuit's opinion is res 
judicata and bars Pride's claims made in this action. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW.1 
Pride filed this lawsuit in 1989, seeking to recover alleged damages which Pride 
claimed it had sustained when HGC refused to perform an alleged oral agreement to lend 
Pride $185,000.00 in consideration for Pride's agreement to grant HGC a license to use 
portions of Pride's land for the Homestead Golf Course. Pride alleged that the bulk of the 
loan was going to be used by Pride to pay various creditors having liens on the land 
owned 50% by Pride with Cal Clark (the "Clark-Pride Property"), and that as a result of 
the failure to make the loan Pride lost the land and suffered damages. [R. 1-33] 
After extensive discovery, the court entered summary judgments dismissing all of 
the Defendants except HGC, its former President, Gerald R. Sanders ("Sanders") and 
1
 In its "NATURE OF THE CASE" section, Pride sets forth a number of purported facts that it does not 
support with citations to the record as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
statements made by Pride are inaccurate in significant respects. For example, Homestead did not promise to loan 
Pride $185,000.00. Instead, as the Tenth Circuit found, the parties discussed such a loan in exchange for a license 
but never agreed upon the terms of the loan or the license. The claim that Homestead admitted that it had promised 
to loan Pride $185,000.00 in exchange for the license and that Homestead only argued that the "promised loan only 
applied to the property other than the fourteenth hole parcel" is likewise not supported by the record. Finally, the 
claim that HGC subsequently purchased all of the Clark-Pride Property is erroneous and is not supported by the 
record. The "NATURE OF THE CASE" section should be stricken and disregarded. 
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Great Inns of the Rockies, which owned stock in HGC at the time of the transactions 
(these defendants did not file summary judgment motions at the time) (Appellees are 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "HGC")- The last summary judgment was entered 
in January 1992. [R. 920-923 & 939-940] 
In the meantime, Pride and HGC were engaged in litigation in federal court in the 
case of Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, Adversary Proceeding No. 89PC-
0255 (the "Federal Action"). HGC had commenced that action in 1989, contending that 
Pride had orally agreed to give HGC a license on property on which the fourteenth hole of 
the golf course was originally constructed (the "Fourteenth Hole Property"). Pride 
defended that case on the basis that no valid license agreement had been entered into and 
the parties had never agreed to its terms, but that in any event HGC was not entitled to a 
license because HGC had failed to make a $185,000.00 loan to Pride in exchange for 
which Pride agreed to give HGC a license on the Fourteenth Hole Property and the Clark-
Pride Property. The principal issues in the Federal Action were whether an agreement 
existed between the parties, what the terms of the agreement were and whether Pride or 
HGC had breached the agreement. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, R. 1258-1273] 
After trial in January 1990, the bankruptcy court ruled that HGC had breached the 
alleged agreement and was, therefore, not entitled to a license. [R. 1363] HGC was 
therefore required to remove the golf course improvements from the Fourteenth Hole 
5 
Property and relocated the fourteenth hole at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
[R. 1422-1424] Homestead, Inc. was also required to purchase land from Crossland 
Savings for $350,000.00 to save the golf course. [R. 1422-1424] 
For the next twelve years the parties litigated the Federal Action, including three 
appeals and a further evidentiary hearing before the bankruptcy court. Pride took no 
action to prosecute the present case for ten years after the summary judgments were 
granted dismissing most of the Defendants in this case back in 1991 and January 1992. 
Ultimately, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins ruled in September 1998 in the Federal 
Action that no agreement existed for Pride to grant HGC a license or for HGC to loan 
Pride money because the parties had never agreed to the terms of such an agreement. [R. 
1274] Thus, HGC had no right to use Pride's land for the golf course. That determination 
was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on September 
12, 2000 in Homestead Golf Club. Inc. v. Pride Stables. 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000). 
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the parties had not agreed on the terms of a loan or license 
and that at most the parties had simply reached an oral agreement to agree, but that the 
parties never agreed upon the terms of the written agreement, or executed a written 
agreement. The Tenth Circuit's ruling was fatal to all of Pride's claims in the present 
case. 
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Pride took no action to attempt to prosecute the present case for fourteen months 
after the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion. Then in November, 2001, Pride took the first 
action it had taken in this case for a decade by belatedly filing a motion for permission to 
file an Amended Complaint to attempt to escape the res judicata effect of the Tenth 
Circuit's decision by asserting new theories of recovery. [R. 971] The district court 
denied that motion on April 13, 2002 on the basis the motion was not timely made and 
that the claims Pride sought leave to assert were barred by the Tenth Circuit's decision, 
and an amendment would, therefore, be futile. [R. 1204-1205] 
Thereafter, on May 21, 2002, HGC filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that the Tenth Circuit's decision was res judicata and barred the claims asserted by 
Pride, and on the basis there was no evidence to support the fraud and interference with 
business relations claims. [R. 1322] Pride opposed the motion, except Pride did not 
oppose dismissal of its Seventh Cause of Action for Interference with Business Relations. 
[R. 1331] Pride also filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment against HGC. 
On September 9, 2002, the district court entered an order granting HGC's motion 
for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint, and denying Pride's cross-motion for 
partial summary judgment. [R. 1509] On September 24, 2002, Pride filed its Notice of 
Appeal. [R. 1517] 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Undisputed Facts Relating to HGC's Summary Judgment. 
The following undisputed material facts fully supported the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of HGC: 
1. As of 1988, Pride had an ownership interest in a large portion of the land upon 
which HGC proposed to construct the Homestead Golf Course. [Complaint, ffl| 9 and 11, 
R. 4-5] This land included a 50% ownership of the Fourteenth Hole Property as well as a 
50% ownership of the Clark-Pride Property. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 3; R. 1260] Pride 
was in default on various loans secured by the Clark-Pride Property. [Tenth Circuit 
Opinion, p. 3, R. 1260] 
2. On May 9, 1988, Pride and HGC discussed Pride's granting HGC a license to 
use Pride's land for the golf course in consideration for a $185,000.00 loan from HGC to 
Pride. [R. 1218; Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 3, R. 1260] 
3. Thereafter, on June 15, 1988, Pride provided a letter to Midway City 
authorizing HGC to commence construction of the golf course on Pride's land, telling 
Midway City that the parties had reached an "agreement in principle" for a license that 
was awaiting documentation. [R. 1306 and 1309; Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 4, R. 1261] 
[Emphasis Added] 
8 
4. In July 1988, HGC gave Pride $5,000.00 of the contemplated loan. [Tenth 
Circuit Opinion, p. 4, R. 1261; R. 1368] 
5. In August 1988, HGC submitted proposed licenses agreements and a 
Promissory Note to Pride for execution in connection with the proposed agreement. Pride 
did not sign the documents. [Condie Depo., p. 128, line 2 to p. 129, line 12, R. 1307-
1308; Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 4-5, R. 1261-1262] 
6. HGC did not make a $185,000.00 loan. [Complaint, ^ 17, R. 7] 
7. In 1989, HGC commenced a legal action against Pride in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Utah, Case No. 89PC-0255, seeking a 
determination that HGC was entitled to a license to use the Fourteenth Hole Property for 
the golf course.2 [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 5, R. 1262] 
8. After years of litigation and three appeals, Judge Jenkins issued a Memorandum 
Opinion and Order in September, 1998, determining that no agreement existed for HGC 
to make the $185,000.00 loan to Pride or for HGC to obtain a license to use Pride's land. 
[Memorandum Opinion and Order, R. 1274; Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 6, R. 1263] 
9. Pride was the prevailing party before Judge Jenkins because Judge Jenkins 
determined HGC was not entitled to a license on the basis that no agreement for a license 
Pride's interest in the Clark-Pride Property was foreclosed by Valley Bank and Crossland Savings & 
Loan. 
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or loan existed. Nevertheless, Pride argued, and the Tenth Circuit ruled, that, "[b]ecause 
the district court's decision that no valid contract existed between the parties will 
collaterally estop Pride in its state court action against HGC, we conclude Pride is entitled 
to appeal the judgment of the district court." [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 2, fn 1, R. 1259] 
10. Judge Jenkins' decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit by written opinion 
filed September 12, 2000. The Tenth Circuit specifically ruled that no agreement existed 
between the parties as the parties had never agreed upon the terms of the loan or license 
and at most their discussions constituted only an agreement to agree. The Tenth Circuit 
ruled that the parties intended to prepare written documentation of an agreement which 
would then constitute the binding contract, but were unable to agree to the terms of the 
written agreement. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 4 and 7-11, R. 1258 & 1264-1268] 
11. On November 7, 2002, fourteen months after the Tenth Circuit issued its 
opinion, Pride filed a motion for permission to file an Amended Complaint to allege a 
claim for breach of contract "made definite by part performance" by Pride; a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing of that supposed contract; 
and a promissory estoppel claim, none of which were contained in the original complaint. 
[R. 975] 
12. Lemuel Stroud ("Stroud"), who was the Vice President and a Director of HGC 
at the time of the alleged oral loan agreement, was alleged by Pride to be the principal 
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wrongdoer in connection with the claims asserted by Pride against HGC. Stroud died a 
few years before Pride filed its motion to amend. [R. 1025] 
2. Facts Relating to Pride's Partial Summary Judgment Motion. 
13. Pride's attempt to argue in the present case that an agreement existed is 
directly contrary to the position it initially took in the Federal Action and to Condie's 
testimony in the Federal Action which by itself showed no agreement was reached: 
(a) The parties did not discuss the terms upon which a license would be granted 
prior to the submission by HGC of proposed license agreements to Pride in August 1988. 
Those license agreements provided that the licenses were granted pursuant to the terms of 
a Master License Agreement (which Pride never signed) that had been previously 
recorded by HGC in connection with licenses that had been granted by other property 
owners. The Master License Agreement was specifically incorporated into the proposed 
license agreements. Condie very clearly testified in the Federal Action that he never 
agreed to the terms of the Master License Agreement. [R. 1420-1471 & 1477-1480] 
(b) Moreover, in September 1989, a year and a half after Pride contends that an 
agreement was made with HGC, Pride's lawyer, John Marshall, wrote to Valley Bank's 
lawyer stating in no uncertain terms that the agreement between HGC and Pride had 
"never been fully agreed or executed." [R. 1470 & 1481] 
11 
(c) In Pride's Trial Brief in the Federal Action, Pride also represented to the 
court that the license agreements had never been agreed to by the parties: 
While defendant [Pride] acknowledges that the parties verbally agreed in 
principle that defendant would grant plaintiff a license, defendant asserts 
that said purported License Agreement is a written document which has 
never been signed by defendant, and its terms have never been agreed upon 
by the parties . . . . 
Defendant claims that plaintiff is not entitled to enforce the terms of the 
said purported License Agreement as it is written because the parties have 
never agreed to its terms. [R. 1470-1471 & 1482-1484] [Emphasis Added] 
(d) In fact, Pride sought entry of a directed verdict after completion of HGC s 
case at trial before the bankruptcy court on the basis that no agreement existed, arguing: 
There is no evidence before the Court that the terms of this written 
License Agreement, which they are trying enforce against Pride, were ever 
discussed or agreed to between the Homestead people and Condie. Now, I 
submit to the Court that the basic elementary contract law says there has to 
be a meeting of the minds. There is no evidence before the Court they ever 
agreed on the terms of the written License Agreement. [R. 1471 & 1485-
1486] 
14. Valley Bank had a lien on the largest portion of the Clark-Pride Property for 
its debt. Contrary to what Pride tells the court, Pride did not lose this property for lack of 
a loan from HGC. In fact, Valley Bank refused to forbear from foreclosure in exchange 
for Pride's proposed payments and the district court dismissed Pride's claims against 
Valley Bank based on the alleged forbearance agreement clear back in 1991. [R. 1498-
1500; 920-923] 
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3. Objection to Pride's "Material Facts" Section, 
HGC objects to many of the "facts" set forth by Pride in its "Material Facts" 
section. However, most of the facts are irrelevant or of only tangential relevance to the 
issues before this court. For brevity's sake, to the limited extent the purported facts are 
significant to the issues on this appeal, HGC will discuss those "facts" in its argument. 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
1. The district court properly denied leave to amend because the new claims that 
Pride sought to assert were barred by res judicata. Thus, an amendment would have been 
futile. 
2. The district court acted well within its discretion in denying Pride leave to 
amend its Complaint that was not filed until ten years after discovery in this action was 
essentially completed, and fourteen months after the Tenth Circuit's decision, in an 
attempt to evade the res judicata effect of that decision, especially given the prejudice 
that would have resulted because of the intervening death of Lemuel Stroud, the fading 
memories of witnesses, the additional discovery that amendment would have necessitated, 
and the fact that, if it is assumed for argument the new theories were not barred by res 
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judicata (which they were), an amendment would have required HGC to relitigate the 
loan obligation on new theories after twelve years of litigation in the Federal Action. 
3. The court properly granted summary judgment in HGC's favor because all of 
the claims asserted in the Complaint (as well as the claims that Pride attempted to assert 
in its proposed Amended Complaint) were barred by res judicata because the Tenth 
Circuit specifically ruled that the alleged loan and license agreement between HGC and 
Pride that is the foundation for all of Pride's claims in the present suit was never made as 
the parties never agreed to the terms of such an agreement. The claims that Pride 
attempted to assert by way of its Amended Complaint were simply new legal theories 
based upon the same underlying transactions, and the same alleged agreement ruled upon 
by the Tenth Circuit. 
4. The fact that the Tenth Circuit would not consider Pride's claims based on §§34 
and 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts because Pride had not raised those 
theories until its reply brief on the third appeal in the Federal Action is irrelevant. Res 
judicata bars all claims and defenses that were raised or could and should have been 
raised in the Federal Action, which is all that is required for res judicata to apply. Pride 
cannot litigate its claims piecemeal in successive lawsuits. In addition, these theories 
were not alleged in the original Complaint. 
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5. The claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing was properly dismissed 
because such a claim is dependent upon a contract between the parties. The Tenth Circuit 
ruled that no contract was ever made. 
6. The promissory estoppel claim is barred because it was not alleged in the 
Complaint, and because in any event it is barred by res judicata. Promissory estoppel is 
simply another alternative legal theory for attempting to create an obligation for HGC to 
make a loan. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit specifically ruled that Pride's claimed part 
performance was not sufficient to create a loan obligation and that HGC was not 
equitably estopped from denying an obligation to make a loan. Again, Pride was 
obligated to raise all of its legal theories on the loan obligation in the Federal Action and 
cannot try those theories piecemeal. Moreover, promissory estoppel requires that the 
promise sought to be enforced be sufficiently definite and certain. The Tenth Circuit 
ruled that there was no sufficiently definite and certain agreement. Also, promissory 
estoppel cannot be applied to bind a party where the party did not intend to be bound 
unless and until a written agreement was prepared and executed. The Tenth Circuit ruled 
that the parties did not intend to be bound in the present case until a written agreement 
was negotiated and signed. 
7. The fraud claim is barred by res judicata because unless there is an underlying 
agreement there can be no intent not to perform that agreement. Further, there was no 
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evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that HGC did not intend to make the 
loan if the terms for a loan and license were agreed to by the parties. The only purported 
evidence pointed to by Pride to attempt to support a supposed fraudulent intent is that 
HGC supposedly imposed a subordination condition before the June 15 commitment 
letter was signed by Pride, allegedly knowing that the subordination condition could not 
be met at that time. However, there is no evidence that HGC imposed the subordination 
condition at the time the oral agreement was allegedly made on May 9 or at the time the 
letter of commitment was given on June 15 or that HGC knew that the lenders would not 
subordinate at that time. Any alleged fraudulent intent is inconsistent with the fact that in 
August HGC actually prepared the loan and license documents for execution by Pride, but 
Pride did not sign them. Further, HGC actually loaned $5,000.00 to Pride in July, 1988, 
pending a final agreement and documentation of that agreement. 
8. The issue of whether HGC had an obligation to loan Pride money and whether 
Pride had an obligation to give HGC a license was fully and fairly litigated in the Federal 
Action. The fact that Pride's Counterclaim for damages was dismissed without prejudice 
on the joint motion of the parties is irrelevant. All that is required for res judicata to bar 
relitigation of an issue is that the critical issue that is claimed to be precluded was fully 
and fairly litigated. 
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9. HGC is not judicially estopped to raise res judicata as a defense because HGC 
has not taken any inconsistent position in this case with any position that HGC 
successfully took in the Federal Action. 
10. Pride's motion for partial summary judgment was properly denied even if it is 
assumed for argument that res judicata does not bar Pride's claims and even if Pride was 
entitled to amend its Complaint because in that event there would be factual issues that 
would have to be determined at trial, including whether an agreement was made, the 
terms of the agreement, whether the agreement was breached, whether injustice could 




A. THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PRIDE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT, 
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1. Leave to Amend Was Properly Denied as Futile Because the Tenth 
Circuit's Decision Is Res Judicata with Respect to the Allegedly New Claims Asserted 
in the Amended Complaint. 
The case law is clear that, "leave to file an amended complaint should be denied 
when the moving party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or futile.v 
Andalex v. Meyers. 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). Because, 
as will be demonstrated in HGC's summary judgment argument, the proposed claims that 
Pride sought leave to assert would have been barred by the Tenth Circuit's ruling, leave to 
amend was properly denied. 
2. Leave to Amend Was Properly Denied Because of Pride's Prejudicial 
Delay in Filing the Motion. 
Pride filed this lawsuit in 1989, twelve years before it filed the motion to amend. 
Pride took no action to prosecute this lawsuit from January 1992, until Pride filed its 
motion to amend in November 2001. Pride attempted below to justify its failure to 
prosecute by arguing this action had been stayed during the pendency of the Federal 
Action. [R. 972 ] Pride now argues that the parties had a "tacit agreement" not to litigate 
this case. Neither position is accurate. No stay was ever entered in this lawsuit. The 
Federal Action did not prevent Pride from prosecuting this action while the Federal Action 
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was pending. In fact, Pride did prosecute this action from 1989 until January 1992, almost 
three years after the Federal Action was filed. Nor was there ever any agreement or 
understanding between the parties to hold this case in abeyance while the Federal Action 
was litigated. Pride simply abandoned this case for a decade. 
If Pride thought it had the additional claims it belatedly sought to assert in 2001, ]t 
had those claims and knew about them at least by 1991 by which time the discovery in this 
case had been essentially completed. There was no excuse whatsoever for Pride to wait a 
full decade to file a motion to amend. 
Further, the Tenth Circuit's decision upon which Pride sought to justify its delay 
was rendered on September 12, 2000. Yet, Pride took no action in this case for fourteen 
months thereafter when it finally filed its motion to amend to attempt to evade that 
decision. Pride attempts to justify this delay by saying it took fourteen months to analyze 
its position after the Tenth Circuit's decision! It would not have taken more than fourteen 
hours to do that analysis. Pride simply sought leave to amend in a vain last minute attempt 
to salvage its case after the Tenth Circuit ruled against Pride on whether HGC had an 
obligation to make a loan. This inexcusable delay is itself sufficient to justify denial of 
leave to amend. 
In addition, according to Pride, Stroud was the principal wrongdoer in connection 
with the claims Pride asserted against HGC. Stroud died a few years before Pride filed its 
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motion to amend. It would have been extremely prejudicial for the district court to allow 
Pride ten years after it last took action in the case to amend its Complaint to assert "new" 
theories against HGC based at least in large part on Stroud's conduct, after Stroud was no 
longer available as a witness to testify against these claims or assist HGC in defense of the 
claims, and after the memories of other witnesses had faded with time. 
Moreover, discovery in this case was essentially completed back in 1991. If the 
court would have allowed an Amended Complaint to be filed a decade later, additional 
discovery would have been required if those claims could have survived summary 
judgment (which they could not). 
Beyond that, Pride attempted to raise these new theories by an Amended Complaint 
after HGC had litigated the alleged loan obligation for many years in the Federal Action. 
It would have been extremely prejudicial to allow Pride to attempt to evade res judicata by 
asserting these new theories for creating a loan obligation to attempt to require HGC to 
have to relitigate the disputes between the parties after all those years even if it were 
assumed for argument that the new theories were not barred by res judicata (which, as 
demonstrated below, they were). 
The case law is clear that leave to amend should be denied where there is undue 
delay, especially when the delay prejudices the opposing party. See, Mountain America 
Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 P.2d 590 (Utah App) cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
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1993); National Distillers & Chemical Corp. v. Brad's Machine Products., Inc.. 666 F.2d 
492 (11th Cir. 1982). Pride simply cannot justify delaying ten years after completing 
discovery to seek leave to amend its Complaint, or waiting to do so until after Stroud died, 
or waiting for fourteen months after the Tenth Circuit's decision. The trial court had 
broad discretion to deny leave to amend and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of 
discretion. See, Hill v. State Farm Mutual 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah App. 1992). The 
district court acted well within its discretion in denying leave to amend. 
Pride argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to 
amend because the proposed Amended Complaint supposedly just contained the same 
factual allegations as the original Complaint and asserted additional causes of action. This 
argument should be rejected for at least three reasons. 
First, Pride did not assert this argument before the district court. [See, R. 971-973 & 
1163-1173] Pride is, therefore, barred from raising this argument on appeal. Ong 
International (U.S.A.). Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
Second, the proposed Amended Complaint did in fact add significant factual 
allegations to attempt to support the new causes of action, as a comparison of the two 
pleadings demonstrates. For example, in paragraph 15 of the proposed Amended 
Complaint, Pride added the allegation that "Defendants knew as of May 9, 1988, that 
Plaintiff was dependent upon the funds to be provided by the promised loan to obtain 
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forbearance from Plaintiffs secured creditors, and Defendants knew that their failure to 
fund the promised loan could result in Plaintiffs loss of its property interests by reason of 
the foreclosure of its secured creditors." In paragraph 16, Pride added the allegation that 
the "promises" made on May 9, 1988 "did not require, as a condition of Defendants' 
fulfillment of the promise, that Plaintiff obtain the subordination of any of Plaintiff s 
secured creditors." Paragraph 17 of the proposed Amended Complaint added the 
allegation that Pride relied upon the promise and representations that the loan of 
$185,000.00 "would be made promptly". In paragraph 18, Pride added the allegation that 
"in making the foregoing promises to each other, the Plaintiff and Defendants intended to 
enter into an enforceable agreement." In paragraph 20, Pride added the allegation that 
Defendants agreed "to contemporaneously prepare a proposed written agreement". The 
original Complaint had only complained about the failure to execute a written agreement. 
Paragraph 21 added the allegation that Defendants refused to fund without subordination 
of Plaintiff s secured creditors and that Defendants anticipatorily repudiated the "promises 
and . . . the intended agreement of May 9, 1988." A number of additional factual 
allegations were also set forth in the new causes of action of the Amended Complaint. 
Moreover, it is not just the new allegations that are contained in the proposed 
Amended Complaint that created prejudice, but it is all the additional evidence that would 
need to be addressed concerning the new legal theories. For example, the promissory 
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estoppel claim would have opened up significant new areas of inquiry with respect to 
whether Pride reasonably relied upon the oral discussions and HGC's conduct, whether 
under all the facts and circumstances it would be unjust to preclude Pride from recovery 
and what relief would be appropriate to avoid the supposed injustice. Pride's ten-year 
delay in seeking leave to amend seriously prejudiced HGC's ability to explore in depth the 
facts relevant to the additional issues raised by the new theories because of Stroud's death 
and because memories of other witnesses had naturally faded with time. 
Finally, even if a Complaint only adds new legal theories without alleging 
additional facts, a court still has the discretion to deny leave to amend and a party has a 
heavy burden to demonstrate abuse of that discretion. See, Viernow v. Euripides 
Development Corp.. 157 F.3d 785, 800 (10th Cir. 1998); Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho. 
31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994); Aurora Credit Services. Inc. v. Liberty West 
Development. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998). Pride has abjectly failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend a decade 
after discovery was essentially completed and 14 months after the Tenth Circuit's 
decision. It was perfectly proper for the district court to deny amendment to assert new 
theories to evade the res judicata effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision where Pride waited 
at least ten years after it knew or should have known of those theories. See. Pallotino. 
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supra, (leave to amend to assert new theory properly denied where plaintiff waited until 
after his primary theory had been dismissed).3 
B. THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
HGC. 
After the district court denied Pride s motion to amend, HGC filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that all of the claims asserted by Pride in the original 
Complaint against HGC and Sanders were barred by the res judicata effect of the Tenth 
Circuit's opinion and, with respect to the fraud claim, that there was no evidence (let alone 
clear and convincing evidence) that HGC or Sanders had committed any fraud. 
Remarkably, Pride opposed that motion by pretending that the very claims that 
Pride had unsuccessfully attempted to add in its proposed Amended Complaint were 
already asserted in its original Complaint! Of course, these claims were not asserted in the 
-5 
Pride argues in passing that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to allow Pride to 
amend but allowing HGC to raise the defense ofres judicata even though it had not been pled as an affirmative 
defense in HGC's Answer back in 1989 This argument ignores the fact that the res judicata defense did not exist 
until eleven years after HGC filed its Answer HGC raised this defense in opposition to the motion to amend as soon 
as Pride attempted to prosecute this action fourteen months after the Tenth Circuit's decision Where the res 
judicata defense did not arise until years after HGC filed its Answer, HGC was entitled to raise the defense in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment See, Kendall v Avon Products, Inc , 711 F Supp 1178, 1179 
( S D N Y 1989) See, also. United States v Shanbaum, 10 F 3d 305, 312 (5th Cir 1994). Moore Owen Thomas & 
Co v Coffey, 992 F 2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir 1993), Oversea Motors, Inc v Import Motors Limited, Inc , 375 F 
Supp 499, 512 (ED Mich 1974), Chase v Weight, 1988 U S Dist LEXIS 10803 (D Ore) Moreover, Pride 
successfully convinced the Tenth Circuit it had standing to appeal Judge Jenkins' decision because that decision 
would be res judicata in this action Pride prevailed on that position in the Tenth Circuit and is, therefore, judicially 
estopped by its own cited case from contending otherwise See, Condas v Condas, 618 P 2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) 
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original Complaint, which is why Pride attempted to amend. In any event, the "new" 
claims are barred by res judicata just as the original claims are barred. 
1. The Law of Res Judicata. 
There are two branches of the doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion. See, Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Both branches 
bar Pride's claims in the present case. 
a. Claim Preclusion, 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action or defense if the suit in which that 
cause of action or defense is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements. 
First, the cases must both involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim or 
defense that is alleged to be barred must have been asserted in the first suit or "must be 
one that could and should have been raised in the first action." Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See, Madsen v. Borthick, supra; 
Ringwood v. Foreign Autoworks. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App. 1990). All these 
requirements are met in the case at bar. Pride and HGC were parties to the Federal Action. 
Pride raised the defense that HGC was not entitled to a license because HGC had failed to 
fulfill its alleged obligation to make a loan and the Tenth Circuit finally ruled on that 
defense by ruling no agreement was made. 
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Where these requirements are met, "the result in the prior action constitutes the full 
relief available to the parties" with respect to the claims or defenses made in the prior 
action. See. Ringwood v. Foreign Autoworks. Inc.. supra. Resjudicata binds the parties 
"not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, 
but as to every other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose." 
Commissioner v. Sunnen. 68 S. Ct. 715, 719 (1948). To the same effect, see. Whitaker v. 
Ameritech Corp.. 129 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1997) (Res Judicata "extends to all questions 
actually decided in a previous action as well as to all grounds of recovery and defenses 
which might have been presented in the prior litigation."); Marine Midland Bank v. 
Slvman. 995 F.2d 362, 366 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
Res judicata is fully applicable to bar a claim whether the claim was asserted as a 
defense or as an affirmative claim in an earlier action. See, e.g.. Bin Saud v. The Bank of 
New York. 929 F.2d 916, 920 (2nd Cir. 1991); American National Bank & Trust Company 
of Ft. Lauderdale v. Romolo. 388 So. 2d 51 (Fla. App. 1980); 50 C.J.S. Judgment §774 
("Matters of defense adjudicated against the defendant in a previous action may not again 
be set up by the defendant either as a defense in further litigation or as the basis of a new 
action by him or against the former plaintiff.") 
A claim or cause of action is the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to an 
enforceable right and entitle a party to judicial interference on his or her behalf. See, 
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American Estate Management Corp. v. International Investment & Development Corp., 
986 P.2d 767-68 (Utah App. 1999). Merely changing legal theories does not constitute a 
new claim. In Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1987) the Utah Court of 
Appeals recognized that trying a second lawsuit on different theories or grounds does not 
avoid res judicata, quoting from the comments to the Second Restatement of Judgments as 
follows: 
"[H]aving been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes 
attempts another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but 
adducing a different substantive law premise or ground. This does not 
constitute the presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is 
related to the same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the 
second action should be held barred." [738 P.2d at 248] [Emphasis Added] 
See also, Dzurella v. State of Kansas, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 1119 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Claim 
preclusion does not allow relitigation of the same issues and facts by the same parties 
under a different theory."). 
For example, in DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), the DeBrys filed their 
first action, alleging that the defendants negligently inspected a building the DeBrys 
purchased and fraudulently issued a temporary occupancy permit for the building. After 
that case was dismissed, the DeBrys then filed a second suit, alleging a breach of contract 
claim based upon the same facts and transactions that were the basis for the negligence 
and fraud claims in the first action. The Utah Supreme Court held that the second suit was 
barred under the doctrine ofres judicata. See also, American Estate Management Corp. v. 
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International Investment & Development Corp., 986 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1999), (First 
action for damages for breach of contract alleging that the defendant had breached an 
agreement by failing to deed an adjacent parking lot parcel to the plaintiff barred second 
action claiming ownership of the parking lot parcel by adverse possession); Wheadon v. 
Pearson, 376 P.2d 946, 947 (Utah 1962), (First action seeking to establish a right-of-way 
under a theory of prescriptive easement barred second action seeking to establish a right-
of-way on a theory of implied easement). 
b. Issue Preclusion. 
The requirements for issue preclusion were explained by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d at 250 as follows: 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, 
and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded 
from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or privy of a 
party. 
Again, all these requirements are met in the present case. The issue is identical, i.e., was 
HGC obligated to make a loan. The issue was fully, fairly and completely litigated for 
twelve years. A final judgment was entered that no loan agreement was made. Pride was 
a party to the Federal Action. 
"[0]nce an issue is raised and determined it is the entire issue that is precluded, not 
just the particular arguments raised in support of it in the first case." ZipDee, Inc. v. 
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Dometic Corp.. 905 F. Supp. 535, 538 (N.D. 111. 1995). As with claim preclusion, the fact 
that different relief is sought in the second action or a different legal theory is asserted in 
the second action is inconsequential. See. Sevy v. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 629, 
632-33 (Utah 1995); Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). The fact that 
Pride sought relief below concerning the Clark-Pride Property and sought relief in the 
Federal Action concerning rights to the Fourteenth Hole Property is not determinative. 
What is determinative is that Pride sought the relief in both cases under the same May 9, 
1998 non-existent agreement to agree. For example, in Robertson, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is not the identity of the thing sued for, or of the cause of action, 
which determines the conclusiveness of a former judgment upon a subsequent 
action, but merely the identity of the issue involved in the two suits. If an issue 
presented in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies is 
shown to have been determined in a former one, the question is res judicata [or 
collateral estoppel], although the actions are based on different grounds, or 
tried on different theories, or are instituted for different purposes and seek 
different relief. [674 P.2d at 1230] [citations omitted] [Emphasis Added] 
To the same effect, see. Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment. 16 P.3d 1251, 1253-
1254 (Utah App. 2000) (second action barred by issue preclusion despite the fact that it 
was based on different legal theory]. 
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2. The Breach of Contract Claim Is Barred, Including Any Such Claim 
under §§34 or 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
Pride alleges in the First Cause of Action of its Complaint that HGC breached an 
alleged oral agreement made on May 9, 1988, to loan Pride $185,000.00 in exchange for a 
license on Pride's land (including both the Clark-Pride Property and the Fourteenth Hole 
Property). However, The Tenth Circuit's decision that this same alleged agreement did 
not exist because the terms were never agreed to by Pride and HGC clearly bars this claim. 
In fact Pride concedes in its brief that the breach of contract claim is barred: 
Pride does not dispute that it cannot in this action pursue a theory that 
there was an express formal contract between the parties. This would be 
subject to res judicata since the parties agree that the 14th Hole Property and 
the Clark-Pride Property were both part of the same negotiations and 
transactions. [Pride Brief, p. 22] [Emphasis Added] 
Pride made the same unavoidable concession at the summary judgment hearing. [R. 1531 
at p. 68] That concession is not only fatal to the breach of contract claims, but to all of 
Pride's claims with respect to the alleged loan obligation on whatever legal theory. 
a. The Section 34 and 69(2) Claims Were Not Alleged in the Original 
Complaint 
Pride attempts an end run around the Tenth Circuit's ruling by arguing that 
HGC's promise is enforceable under §34 (based on part performance) and 69(2) (based on 
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implied contract by conduct) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. [Pride Brief, pp. 
20-22] These theories were not alleged in the original Complaint. 
In fact, Pride admitted below that its Section 34 and 69(2) claims were not 
contained in its original Complaint when it told the district court in its memorandum in 
support of the motion to amend that the Tenth Circuit's Opinion affirmed Judge Jenkins' 
decision that "no express contract" was entered into between the parties, and that: 
The proposed First Amended Complaint sets out Plaintiffs claims to 
conform with this ruling, and in particular to state claims under the doctrines 
enunciated in Restatement (Second) of Contract, §§34 and 69(2), which the 
Tenth Circuit explicitly reserved in its opinion. [R. 972] 
b. The Section 34 and 69(2) Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata. 
Moreover, in attempting to allege claims based upon these restatement 
sections Pride is merely relying upon different legal theories to attempt to recover for 
breach of contract based upon the same underlying transactions involved in the Federal 
Action. Indeed, Pride affirmatively argues that these theories are based upon the same 
facts as those originally alleged with respect to its breach of contract claim. [Pride Brief, 
pp. 22 & 30-31] The claims based upon these legal theories are, therefore, barred by the 
Tenth Circuit's ruling that no agreement for a loan and license ever existed, as 
demonstrated by the cases cited above. 
Contrary to what Pride argues, the fact that the Tenth Circuit refused to consider the 
Section 34 and 69(2) theories does not entitle Pride to now litigate those theories. Instead, 
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the Tenth Circuit refused to consider the arguments Pride made concerning those theories 
on the basis those legal theories were raised for the first time (after 11 years of litigation) 
in Pride's reply brief on the third appeal, and were thus barred. See, e.g.. Levin v. 
Childers. 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996). [See, Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 14, n. 9 & 15, R. 
1271-1272] Pride could have and should have timely raised its alternative legal theories in 
the Federal Action if it wished to rely on those theories, which is all that is required for res 
judicata to apply. See, Debry, 889 P.2d at 444; Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P2d at 247. The 
fact that Pride failed to timely raise these theories in the Federal Action does not mean it 
can relitigate the loan obligation issue on these new theories in this case. 
The defense asserted by Pride in the Federal Action was that HGC was obligated to 
make Pride a loan and failed to perform that obligation so that Pride had no obligation to 
grant a license. Pride is bound by the Tenth Circuit's ruling that no loan obligation (or 
license obligation) existed, and cannot collaterally evade that decision by attempting to 
create an enforceable obligation on some different legal theory. The complete issue of 
whether an obligation existed between Pride and HGC pursuant to which HGC was 
obligated to make a loan and Pride was obligated to grant a license was before the Tenth 
Circuit and finally ruled upon by the Tenth Circuit. Indeed, Pride's claim that its part 
performance of the alleged agreement by allowing HGC to start construction of the golf 
course on Pride's property was sufficient to obligate HGC to make a loan and that HGC's 
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conduct equitably estopped HGC from denying such an obligation were considered and 
rejected the Tenth Circuit. [See, Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 14-16, R. 1271-1273] 
3. The Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Was Properly Dismissed Because There Was No Contract Between the 
Parties, 
The Tenth Circuit's decision that no agreement existed between Pride and HGC 
is also fatal to Pride's Eighth Cause of Action for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing contained in the original Complaint, alleging that HGC refused to perform its 
obligations under the purported contract in good faith. The good faith and fair dealing 
claim that Pride attempted to allege in the Amended Complaint was the same as in the 
original Complaint except Pride alleged the agreement of which the covenant was a part 
was made definite by part performance. 
A claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a claim for 
breach of contract, and is dependent upon an underlying contract. See, Andreini v. 
Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (affirming summary judgment because no 
contract existed); The Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 289 (Utah 
App. 1994). Because the Tenth Circuit held no agreement existed, there is no legal basis 
for the good faith and fair dealing claim. 
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4. The Promissory Estoppel Claim Is Barred. 
a. The Promissory Estoppel Claim is Not Alleged in the Complaint. 
As stated earlier, Pride sought leave to file an Amended Complaint to add a 
promissory estoppel claim and the district court properly denied that motion. In opposition 
to the summary judgment motion, Pride pretended that claim had already been asserted in 
the original Complaint. But, there is no promissory estoppel claim in the original 
Complaint. Thus, Pride could not avoid summary judgment by relying on that theory. 
b. The Promissory Estoppel Claim is Barred by Res Judicata. 
Beyond that, even if Pride had pleaded such a claim, it is barred by res 
judicata. Pride alleges in the proposed Amended Complaint that HGC promised to loan 
$185,000.00 and to prepare documentation for execution,4 that those promises induced 
Pride to allow HGC to commence construction of the course on Pride's land and that 
Pride's reliance on HGC's promises resulted in damages. [R. 989-992] This argument 
does not get around the Tenth Circuit's ruling for at least three reasons. 
First, the promissory estoppel claim is simply another alternative legal theory for 
attempting to create an obligation on the part of HGC to make a loan based upon the same 
underlying transactions already considered and ruled upon by the Tenth Circuit. In fact, as 
4
 The Tenth Circuit found that HGC prepared documentation for the transaction, but Pride never signed it. 
[See Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 4 & 9-10, R. 1261 & 1266-1267] 
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stated above, the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected Pride's clain 1 tl lat its claimed p< n t 
,-i f nuance was sufficient to create a loan obligation. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 14 15, 
. ... -.
 ( .UMIM lii.i.nih...' ^ u led the argument that I IGC's condi ict equitably 
' . \ ••• • ' i i k i ; i i inn, in in | II i • i m III i ( m iiiiiil < i p i m m i i M II '" II if T 
R. 12 72-1273] Equitable estoppel is one application of promissory estoppel See, 
Ra\ arino v. Price. 260 P.2d 570, 575 (I Jta.li 1953). .-
. ; ie argues that promissory estoppel H nm\ .uailahlc a^  a remedy in the absence 
<>l ;M !• ••'- egal theories 
piecemea.. ii c«xAnot litigate successive lawsuits dediim:'! "!' :- •* ••*< ''MIM' 
transactions by litigating an express contract theory in the first action, an implied contract 
theory in. the second action and a promissory estoppel theory in a third action,, etc., etc. 
I In1 isMit1 ol wtiplhrr 11( if,1 ini, T, obligated lu mala a Inaii iti Mi idi w as I'nlh liliuad tl HI lhe 
Federal Action. * ride is barred from attempting to re.litip.ate thai i^ue iindei \\ H »ir\ ci 
legal theory. 
Second, promissory estoppel require, inai the promise sought to be enforced be 
suiticientk definite •mid t rrlnin Sec, LJJ;,, J.K. Simplot Co. v. Sales King tut., hit I 
P 3d 1100, 1.1.07 (Utah 2000); Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. Inc.. 989 P.2d 1077, 
I IIS*- .ijt 1090^ The Tenth Circuit has already determined that the agreement or 
pi»HI - . ... .. -_ ..n.... *
 4 idc s agreement to grant a license on its 
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property for the construction of the golf course was not sufficiently definite and certain 
because the terms were never agreed to by the parties. [See, Tenth Circuit Opinion, pp. 7-
11, R. 1264-1268] How can HGC be obligated on any theory make a loan on terms that the 
Tenth Circuit has already ruled were never agreed to by the parties? 
Third, promissory estoppel cannot be applied to bind a party where the party did not 
intend to be bound by a promise unless and until a written agreement was prepared and 
executed. See, e.g.. Advanced Marine Technologies, Inc. v. Burnham Securities, Inc., 16 
F. Supp.2d 375, 381-382 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); R.G. Group, Inc. v. The Horn and Hardart 
Company, 751 F.2d 69, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 1984); Tuscany, Inc. v. Paragon Capital Corp., 
2000 Wash. App. Lexis 1609 (Wash. App.); Livesey v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 577 
N.W.2d 387 (Wise. App. 1998). The Tenth Circuit expressly ruled in the Federal Action 
that the parties did not intend to be bound until written documentation was prepared and 
signed which would then constitute the binding contract between the parties. [See, Tenth 
Circuit Opinion, pp. 10-11, R. 1267-1268] 
For all these reasons, any claim of promissory estoppel is barred by res judicata. 
36 
'i I In I f ani l "1 Lulu i> I l i i i j i i l | n iit i J iiUuuiu a i id j i l i A M I L * L » * - I ' . IK'* ' *» 
No Evidence, Let Alone Clear and Convincing Evidence, to Support the Fra ud 
Pride alleges in its Nintl i Cause of Action that I IGC defrauded Pi ide because 
claim was properly dismissed for two reasons. '' 
a. The Fraud Claim is Barred by Res Judicata. 
First, the Tenth Circuit's decision that no agreement for a loan, existed is fatal 
1
 ' "I1'1" lutuil i |,in 't'^.'nurd M"" !hr NM1!'1 uisc nl Adiois jl! !!K ( cinplaint because a 
frauc[ claim cannot be r .- o q 
contract ii no contract was c\ci made. See, e.g., American Viking ("ontractorv \ 
Scribner Equipment Co.. Inc.. "45 F 2d -V,5. i r* : ']:* ~\r. 1084), r he Bank of El P 
: -L. •- Niamey nooi i U.. nu .^ . \..N- i - -secausc the Tent^ 
mled thai mi i nnliMi I w u i in nuili" IK i( iml 'Limit us i. nulil nil I lutw Ii.nl .i 
fraudulent intent not to make a loan when the terms upon which the loan wouk-
were never agreed to by the parties. 
In fact, many courts have held that even if there is an underlying agreement, where the underlying 
agreement is not enforceable (for example, under the statute of frauds) there can be no fraud claim. See, e.g., 
Pelletier v. Stuart-James Company, Inc., 863 F.2d 1550, 1555-1556 (11th Cir. 1989); Caplan v. Roberts. 506 F.2d 
1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1974); Kiely v. Raytheon Company, 105 F.3d 734, 737 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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Pride cites Berkeley Bank v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980) and Cerritos 
Trucking Co. v. Utah Ventura No. One. 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982), to attempt to 
support its position. However, all those cases stand for is the general proposition - - which 
HGC does not dispute - - that fraud can be predicated upon an intent not to perform a 
promise at the time the promise is made. Those cases did not even involve an issue as to 
whether there could be such fraud if no contract was ever formed. In fact, in both of those 
cases, contracts indeed existed between the parties. 
Pride attempts to avoid res judicata by drawing a distinction between an agreement 
and a promise. [Pride Brief, pp. 23-24] Pride argues that even if an agreement did not 
exist, HGC promised to make a loan and that alleged promise can give rise to a claim of 
fraud if there was no intent to perform the promise at the time it was made. There is no 
basis for the purported distinction in this case. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the parties had 
discussed a loan and license but never agreed on the terms on which the loan and license 
would be given. Even if Pride characterizes the discussions as a promise by HGC to make 
a loan, the fact remains that the terms on which HGC would make the "promised" loan 
(and Pride would give a license) were never agreed upon by the parties. 
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b. Til e re Is No Evidence to Support the Fraud Claim. 
pi ,L was required to prove its fraud claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
I his same nurdn. appuai on summary judgment. See, Andalex v. Meyers. 871 P 2d 1041 
) . 
I here was no evidence whatsoever - • ie: M> -
thatHGC did n*s* intend thai T7r*f would make a loan n an agreement were reached 
i\\w ei. .-. i arii.- i he mere fact that the alleged agreement \\a> not performed was not 
•'• ' ;.:iwi;u See, e.g., Anglo-
caliiornia Trust I'o. v. Half 211 1\ 991 ^Utah 192" 'wucn r.ncig} Kesuu»iw». i u> -
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 1105 TT.S. Dki I exi* 21943 (N.D. CaL); Brigman v. Deiute, •' 
v ^ .„ ; - , ... , )-, * 
Moremei, die \ «>titciil i« m ih »1 I K i< " did uni m lend in make a loan if an agreement 
were reached is completely inconsistent with the fact that lit i A I lgi ist -KK : j- • -)i H lsel 
sent to Pride various loan documents, including a Promissory Note and license agreements, 
l»ui Miaul l( i v\ Inch I H it' would loan the money to Pride. However, Pride did not sign these 
docunietil1. |K I IS ! i/iilli I 'nrnii ()piiiinii, |i|i I .iiiiii I II I"1 l.!nl .iini Lt)K ( mi lie parties 
intended that their agreement be reduced to writing and executed.' . 
The district: court did not reach tl lis issue because it correctly deternii.i-_u uu\, uic uictv of an agreement 
barred the fraud claim, However, this court, can affirm on any legal basis apparent on the record. See, e.g.., Orton v. 
Cartel, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (I Itah 1998). 
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documentation, but Pride did not sign it.")] The contention is also inconsistent with the 
fact that in July 1988, HGC actually advanced Pride $5,000.00 of the contemplated loan to 
pay to Crossland pending a final agreement and documentation of that agreement. [See, R. 
1368 and 1261] In view of the these facts, it is frivolous to contend that HGC and Sanders 
had no intent to make a loan if an agreement were reached. 
Pride attempts to support its fraud claim by arguing that the evidence demonstrates 
HGC supposedly did not intend to make the loan at the time Pride signed the letter of 
commitment to Midway City on June 15, 1988 (five weeks after the oral agreement was 
allegedly made), informing Midway City that Pride had no objection to the issuance of a 
building permit for HGC to start construction of the golf course. This argument is 
unavailing. 
First, Pride alleged, and the Tenth Circuit determined, that the discussions which 
Pride claims constitute the alleged agreement occurred on May 9, 1988, five weeks before 
the letter of commitment was written. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 3; R. 1260] It was at that 
time that HGC supposedly promised to make a loan. Any fraudulent intent would have 
had to exist at that date. There is no evidence whatsoever that HGC did not intend to 
make a loan as of May 9 if the terms of the agreement were agreed to and appropriate 
written agreements signed. 
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• Second, the June 15 letter of commitment was sun - ! • « 
in which Pride stated that an agreement in principle had been reached by the parties that 
was awaiting final documentation [Sec, K • MNI Pride thus acknowledged that the 
partii1^ l ud n<»t M1! ic'telied :» l inai ajjrcemi'i i i i in i r n i l I i n ni k d ili.il ilie parties 
intended that the terms of the agreement be negotiated and that the .vr.
 fc -i -.-r 
writing ,DU\ ^ V >* Tinih Circuit Opinion, ri- o. ; R, 1267-1268] Pride presented no 
evidence bt\ou
 f (I1)l , u ,, did not intend at the time the letter of commitment was given to 
The onl} ,»"i')urLca "evidence" thai Pride relies on * - supposed hai 
inlen! H dial at iiu unu. the letter of commitment was given on June 15, 1988, HUC 
allciiccll} knew thai Crossland Savings and Davis County Bank would not subordinate. 
, = .^ J *» s» ^ uppo^ao -,.ieu -
dial nine that those financial institutions would not yubun'r-\ i\ 
make a loan •without subordinations, it must not have intended to make a loan a^  of June 
••'is argument is speculuhoh !>a>eu upon a false premise, and misstates the evidence, 
1 lu TO U;I I I INK i n in I n it r ilia I i l( if ' IIIII|"H i »mj i Mibon I I I I L I I nui indi i imi mi I i ide 
before the June 15 commitment letter was signed by Pride. Even more importn- - -\ " 
was no evidence that HGC knew Prided lenders would • m subordinate at thai L.uc. 
'i ni testimony -. . . *; attempt to support its claim that HGC had such knowledge 
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is that of Cal Clark's attorney, Grant McFarlane. That testimony does not support Pride's 
argument in the slightest. McFarlane simply testified that the only lender that had a lien 
on property on which Cal Clark had a personal obligation was Valley Bank and that 
McFarlane discussed with HGC that Cal Clark could not obtain subordination of lenders 
other than Valley Bank. [R. 1487-1488] Of course, Cal Clark could not obtain 
subordinations from lenders with which he had no relationship, and was not a borrower on 
their loans. But, there was no evidence whatsoever that HGC knew at that time that Pride 
could not obtain subordinations or that these lenders were not willing to subordinate. 
In short, the parties had agreed in principle to a loan and a license on May 9, 1988. 
The terms of the loan and license were to be negotiated and documented and written 
agreements signed. The parties did not agree on a number of terms of the agreements. 
When the proposed written agreements were presented by HGC to Pride in late August 
1988, Pride never signed the agreements and no agreement was ever made. [Tenth Circuit 
Opinion, pp. 8-11; R. 1265-1268] Therefore, no loan or licenses were ever given. 
6, Pride's Argument That Res Judicata Does Not Apply Because the Issues 
Were Not Fully Litigated in the Federal Action Is Without Merit 
Pride erroneously argues that res judicata does not apply because all of the 
issues relating to its claim for damages that it asserted by way of Counterclaim in the 
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Federal Action were not full\ and fairh litmated in (he 1 rdei.il Admin il « * 'uui Irn I.inn 
was dismissed without prejudice and the- ! enth Circuit supposedly held that its decision 
would have no effect on Fnui. s claim relating to the Clark-Pride Property. [Pride Brief, 
t. 
I 'irst, it is irrelevant that Pride did not litigate its Counterclair -• e 
Feder.il Action.7 The controlling fact is u. -.\ Prided delense that it was not obh^aieu .J 
?rani .i^n.^ t- ,^^ :W,IU.A ii(»C l.i.kii \o meet its obligation +o loan money to Pride 
lor res judicata 
purposes is that the critical issue on which the prior decisioi 1 is claii ned to •* d i 
was fully and fairly litigated. See, .e.g., Kinslow v. Ratzlaff. 158 F.3d 1104, 110^ (101, Cir. 
1998 . he present case, the critical issue of the existence and terms of an obh'uati«-r 
was fnlh find Ihiih lilifaU'd ad nauseam m (In, ledeuil A IIMII lai eleven year* Asa 
result of the determination of that issue in the Federal A e 11 u»i, I *i i 11», • \m, • : 
happy to keep the benefits of thai decision, but is also bound by the burd—^. 
Pride attempts to rely on a footnote in the I enth Circuit's opinion to escape res 
judicata. llo>\e\i i
 (• 11 ih< Irnlh I m ml slated in lonlnoii ' iiiiii paiR" L' nl ir< opinion \\\ 
1269] relied upon by Pride was that if some separate agreement existed relating soleh to 
Contrary n> what Pride argues, ihe CounieK:aim was dismissed without prejudice based upon the joint 
motion ••• hod-Pride .irnHJOr -r^ ' :* ; J - S : 
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the Clark-Pride Property other than the agreement that was the subject of the Federal 
Action, the Tenth Circuit's decision would not affect such other agreement. If Pride were 
contending in the present case that there was an agreement relating to the Clark-Pride 
Property that was separate and independent from the agreement dealt with by the Tenth 
Circuit, Pride's argument may have some force. However, the short answer is there was 
no other alleged agreement. Pride does not argue, and has never argued, that an agreement 
was reached relating to the Clark-Pride Property that was separate from the agreement that 
was allegedly reached on the Fourteenth Hole Property. Pride contended both in the 
Federal Action (after originally contending there was no agreement) and in this case that 
there was one agreement between the parties and that agreement, made on May 9, 1988, 
was that HGC would make a $185,000.00 loan in exchange for a license on the Clark-
Pride Property and the Fourteenth Hole Property. [See, e.g., R. 1531 at p. 46; R. 1280-
1284; R. 1265-1266; Pride Brief, p. 24, n. 9] The Tenth Circuit ruled that agreement was 
never made. Indeed, as demonstrated above. Pride concedes in its brief that the Tenth 
Circuit's decision is res judicata on any express contract theory.8 [Pride Brief, p. 22] 
Pride misstates the record by asserting that the district court in the Federal Action determined that the 
loan agreement related solely to the Clark-Pride Property and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Pride has not cited any 
support in the record for this remarkable assertion, and there is none. In fact, the bankruptcy court ruled that HGC 
was not entitled to a license on the Fourteenth Hole Property because HGC anticipatorily repudiated the agreement 
the bankruptcy court found to exist to make $185,000.00 loan to Pride. [R. 1372-1374] Judge Jenkins ruled that no 
agreement was ever entered into between the parties for a loan and license so that HGC did not have a right to a 
license to use the Fourteenth Hole Property but if he was wrong and an agreement did exist, then the anticipatory 
repudiation finding was not clearly erroneous. [R. 1284 & 1294-1295] The Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge Jenkins' 
decision that no agreement existed, thereby mooting the portion of Judge Jenkins' decision concerning anticipatory 
repudiation. [R. 1258] 
44 
node's argument is also direct!}' coin - -• • • h 
Circu!- u• convince thai court that Pride had standing to appeal Judge Jenkins' ruling 
despiic U.L i jet that Pru.v. iiau been the prevailing pnrtv K-foi, Tudge Jenkins, Pride told 
v . /iKi.-i - decision would bar 
Pride's claims in the present case, inc icm: - w \ * ^ t 
. li-'''1 * decision that no valid contract existed between the parties will collaterally estop 
Pride in its state court, action against 1 IGC ." [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 2 fn 1, R 
1259] 
7. HGC Is Not Judicially Estopped to Raise Res Judicata as a Defense. 
Pride ii correctly argues that because HGC moved to dismiss Pride's 
1
 i . .illy moved for dismissal ^\ *. ?e 
Counterclaim without prejudice, I IGC is sumehou (iiiln i,ill<, r .topped hum is A nnni ft s 
judiciifa as a c\-f ., u»ilie claims in this action. [Pride Brief, pp. 19-20] There is 
abso. ,.\y no idtii.it, or legal b.iMs U»!' this contention. 
case and prevailed on that position should not as :: ivncral rule be * Tif itli "d lo mainliiiii the 
opposite position in another action See, Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 ( Utah 
. ^ ;S not taking an mcuiiMMcnl pmii. ;• in this case, Instead, HGC's res 
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judicata defense is based upon the fact that the Tenth Circuit ruled on whether HGC was 
obligated to lend Pride $185,000.00 and whether Pride was obligated to give HGC a 
license in connection with the claims, defenses and issues actually litigated in the Federal 
Action. The Tenth Circuit's decision that HGC had no obligation to make a loan because 
no agreement was made by the parties bars relitigation of that defense or issue. The fact 
that Pride's Counterclaim for damages in the Federal Action had previously been 
dismissed by stipulation is irrelevant. 
C. PRIDE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED, 
Pride erroneously argues that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on the First 
Cause of Action of its Amended Complaint on its implied contract theories under Sections 
34 and 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and on its Second Cause of Action 
for promissory estoppel. This argument is without merit because if it is assumed for 
argument that res judicata does not apply and that Pride was entitled to amend, there 
would have been at least a number of factual questions to be decided including whether an 
agreement existed, whether the alleged part performance and conduct of the parties was 
sufficient to create an implied contract, what the terms of the alleged agreement were, 
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whether ii(JC aacU in go^u lami, wiiethcr HGC breached the .dieted . n v , -
^ id, reasonabh relied • p Mu. alleged promise to make a loan, whether the reliance 
r e s u l t ; IL u>s» • n;.. Aiuii.u UIUI^IILL could only be avoided by enforcing the alleikd 
' I he evidence was conip'.'HinL' ^ r1 on agreement was reached ^ :!v ^r * 
evidence demonstrated that I IGC and Pride nexer cv en d^a^sed the terms upon which 
licences would tx granted prior to the ^ahmission by 1 Id* oi proposed license aareeim uts 
granted pursuant to the terms of a Master i icense Agreement that had been nrc\ ,uu,,. 
^ . oj ^ ied hy HGC. The Master License Agreement \\ as specifically incorporated into Uic 
proposed license agreements Condie very clearly testified in the Federal Action that he 
rirvn .M^IT'I) lolhc IIITIIF of Ihr Miriln 1 in/use Afiieeitn nil fSt )l IMim I nUlif I lius. IViule 
never agreed to the terms of a license. 
Further, in September 1989, one and a half years after Pride nowr contends an 
agreement was made. Pride's lawyer wrote K- * ...te\ Bains (s lawyer stating in no uncertain 
terms mat Pride liuitl nruM aynvd In lln- Mjsiti I it nisr \yhrinriil .11j11 ilui iht jgrecmeiH 
li comprehensively; Pride opposed HGC's motion for sumn lai y judgment by arguing thai HH. • cderal 
Action is not res judicata, but inconsistently attempted to rely upon the bankruptcy court's ruling that an agreement 
was made to attempt to obtain partial summary judgment. Obviously, the bankruptcy court's ruling that HGC was 
obligated to loan money to Pride is entitled to no effect in the present case because, as demonstrated above, Judge 
Jenkins and the Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling, and held that no agreement existed because the 
parties had never agreed on the terms of u h;*n nuA license 
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between HGC and Pride had "never been fully agreed upon or executed." [SOF No. 13(b)] 
Indeed, contrary to what Pride now argues to the court, Pride repeatedly argued and 
presented testimony at trial before the bankruptcy court that no agreement existed between 
the parties. In Pride's Trial Brief before the bankruptcy court, Pride represented to the 
court that the license agreement had never been agreed to by the parties. [SOF No. 13(c)] 
In fact, Pride sought entry of a directed verdict after completion of HGC s case at trial 
before the bankruptcy court on the basis that no agreement existed. Pride's counsel argued 
that Pride had never signed or agreed to a license agreement with HGC. [SOF No. 13(d)]10 
The claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
simply a claim for breach of contract. As demonstrated above, if there was no underlying 
contract, there can be no claim for breach of this covenant. Further, if reality were 
suspended and res judicata ignored, there would obviously be issues respecting good faith 
which are fact sensitive and generally not appropriate for a decision on summary 
judgment. See, Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60-61 (Utah App. 1996). 
Pride disingenuously tells the court that the Pretrial Order in the Federal Action provided that Pride and 
HGC orally agreed that HGC would lend Pride the sum of $185,000.00 so that it was undisputed that a promise was 
made. This argument was squarely rejected by the Tenth Circuit, which ruled that the Pretrial Order was not 
inconsistent with the holding that the parties had not agreed on the terms on which HGC would make a loan or 
receive a license and that the parties had simply agreed to agree in the future. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 12, n.6, R. 
1269] Pride also attempts to rely on the letter of commitment to create an agreement, but the Tenth Circuit cited that 
letter to support is ruling that no agreement existed. [Tenth Circuit Opinion, p. 10; R. 1267] 
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The elements of proi i lissoi y estoppel are as follc ' ;s: 
i he plaintiff acted w illi prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise 
made by the defendant. (2» 1 he deieiuiant KMI-W nai the plaintiff had relied 
MI! the promise which ihe defendant should reasonably expect to induce 
ivUon or forbearance on the part of the plaintiff or a third person; (3) The 
defendant was aware of all material iaets; (4* The plaintiff relied on the 
promise and the reliance resulted in a los> to 'he plaintiff See. Nunley v 
Wcstates Casing Services. Inc.. 989 I} M f<>" - ^ ^ i v a , moo. 
1 Jnder §90 of the Restatement, a promise "is binding if injustice can be avoided on!'- • r 
enforcement of the promise." [Id,] 
i • , .. rni.xsory estoppel reqim e> mat the promise sought tr- be 
enforced be sufiicu -tlvdefini: -i A 
tippl" ' to bind a part) where the part) dij i.oi intend to be bound unless and until a 
v. Titten agreement was signed. Even if it were assumed that the Tenth Circuit's decision 
HI 11 n M, laeliul issues against I 'ride were not res judicata, these issues wouki h* --c to be 
determined at trial. 
" u ould also have to be determined at trial whether injustice could only be avoi ! 
by enforcement of the alleged promi.se to make' the loan 1. he finder of fact '^  • - '. ha\ e w 
deten nine tl lat issi te ii I <« i 2 i v of e \ idence Df all of tl le facts and circumstances, m«. aiding 
the fact that HGCncvcr obtained an\ licenses that ll(i( ". ' , "nfii'iini in i rM' il c L-MM 
e Mirsc off the Fourteenth Hole Property at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars, and 
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that Homestead, Inc. was required to purchase portions of the golf course on which 
Crossland Savings had a lien at a cost of $350,000.00. 
Finally, Pride claims that it lost the Valley Bank property for lack of a loan and that 
the bankruptcy court so found. However, the bankruptcy court made no such finding. 
Indeed, Valley Bank had refused to forbear from its foreclosure in exchange for the 
proposed payments by Pride [R. 1363; 1498-1500] and the district court long ago 
dismissed Pride's claims against Valley Bank relating to the purported forbearance 
agreement. [R. 920-923] Pride has not appealed that dismissal. And, all of the Davis 
County Bank property was going to be used for the golf course. At the very least, whether 
Pride suffered a loss as a result of HGCs alleged conduct raises factual issues. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judgment 
in favor of HGC and the denial of Pride's partial summary judgment should be affirmed in 
all respects. 
DATED this [Q day of February, 2003. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and 
ALLEY, Senior District Judge.* 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
After approximately ten years of litigation regarding an oral agreement to 
construct a portion of a golf course by plaintiff-appellee Homestead Golf Club, 
Inc. ("HGC") on property owned by defendant-appellant Pride Stables ("Pride"), 
allegedly in exchange for a loan, the district court decided that the parties had not 
created an enforceable contract and dismissed the case. Exercising jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291, we affirm.1 
The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, Senior District Judge, United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 
1
 We requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether Pride has 
standing to appeal the order of the district court when it prevailed on the merits. 
"'While it is the general rule that a party cannot appeal from a judgment in his 
favor, the rule is not absolute, and where a judgment gives the successful party 
only part of that which he seeks and denies him the balance, with the result that 
injustice has been done him, he may appeal from the entire judgment." See 
Jarvis v. Nobel/Svsco Food Servs. Co.. 985 F.2d 1419, 1424 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manlev Wet Wash Laundry Co., 168 
F.2d 381, 386 (10th Cir. 1948)); cf. American Ready Mix. Inc. v. Behles. 14 F.3d 
1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that parties are "aggrieved" by a 
bankruptcy court's decision "if the order . . . diminishes their property, increases 
their burdens, or impairs their rights" (internal quotation and citation omitted)), 
ecause the district court's decision that no valid contract existed between the 
parties will collaterally estop Pride in its state court action against HGC, we 




HGC was organized to construct a golf course on property adjacent to the 
Homestead Resort in Midway, Utah. Pride owned a fifty-percent interest in the 
property on which the fourteenth hole of the golf course was to be built (the 
"fourteenth hole property"), as well as a fifty-percent interest in other property 
co-owned by Cal Clark on which other portions of the golf course were to be 
constructed (the "Clark-Pride property"). In 1987, HGC and Pride began 
negotiating the construction of portions of this golf course on Pride's property. 
By Spring 1988, however, Pride was in default on loans secured by the Clark-
Pride property from Valley Bank & Trust Co. ("Valley Bank"), Davis County 
Bank ("DCB"), and Crossland Savings & Loan ("Crossland") and was pursuing 
forbearance agreements with some of these lenders to forestall foreclosure 
proceedings. 
On May 9, 1988, Pride purportedly granted an oral license to allow HGC to 
construct the golf course on portions of its property in exchange for a loan of 
$185,000—an amount Pride needed to obtain forbearance from its secured 
creditors on the Clark-Pride property. Notably, the parties dispute whether the 
loan related only to HGC's use of the Clark-Pride property or whether it related 
to HGC's use of both the Clark-Pride and fourteenth hole properties. 
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Pending written documentation of this oral agreement, Pride and the other 
property owners signed a letter of commitment on June 15, 1988, permitting HGC 
to begin construction of the golf course on the fourteenth hole property. The 
letter of commitment stated: 
We . . . give this letter of commitment to the City of Midway . . . for 
the purpose of issuing a building permit to [HGC]. By this letter we 
indicate our commitment to granting to [HGC] an appropriate 
easement or license over the property . . . for the purpose of their 
developing a golf course in Midway, Utah. The underlying 
agreements between the parties necessary to make such a 
commitment have been reached in principle and are awaiting final 
documentation, which is expected to be prepared and signed within 
the next two weeks. As such, we have no objection to the granting of 
a construction permit to [HGC] for the purpose of beginning 
construction on the proposed golf course in Midway, Utah. 
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) During the next month, the City of Midway granted 
the permit, and HGC began construction. HGC also gave Pride's General 
Partner, Robert Condie, a check in the amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and 
Crossland. 
Despite the letter of commitment, the parties were unable to agree in 
writing on the terms of their oral agreement. In August, Pride received a 
proposed license agreement from HGC for the Clark-Pride property and a 
promissory note for $185,000. HGC prepared a separate license agreement for 
the fourteenth hole property. Pride did not sign either of the license agreements. 
In the face of threatened foreclosure, Pride requested a modification of the loan 
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and its payment, but HGC alleges it would not agree to the modifications unless 
Pride obtained agreements from its lenders to subordinate their loans to the 
license granted to HGC. Creditors would not sign the subordination agreements, 
and HGC refused to make the modified loans. 
Seeking a declaration that it had the right to use the fourteenth hole 
property, HGC filed this adversary proceeding against Pride on April 28, 1989 in 
bankruptcy court. Pride had filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code in May 1987, and a plan of reorganization had been 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court in March 1988. After trial on HGC's 
complaint, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Pride. On appeal, 
the district court reversed and remanded, finding insufficient evidence in the 
record to support the bankruptcy court's conclusion that HGC had breached the 
May 9, 1988 agreement in December of that year by failing to fund the proposed 
loan. 
On remand, the bankruptcy court entered judgment for HGC, but on further 
appeal the district court again remanded, this time for consideration of 
"unresolved factual issues" that the bankruptcy court had failed to address.2 
After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered judgment for Pride and 
2
 Specifically, the district court instructed the bankruptcy court to consider 
whether HGC had repudiated the May 9, 1988 agreement in September 1988. 
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dismissed HGC's complaint, finding that HGC had anticipatorily repudiated the 
parties' loan agreement in September 1988. 
On appeal for the third time, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's dismissal of HGC's complaint, but on alternative grounds. Without 
reversing the determination of the bankruptcy court that HGC had anticipatorily 
breached the agreement, the district court held that dismissal of HGC's complaint 
was required because no enforceable contract existed. Pride filed a motion to 
amend the judgment to alter the district court's holding that the parties did not 
create an enforceable contract, which the district court denied. The parties filed 
cross-appeals from the district court's judgment.3 
II 
Reviewing a district court's decision in its capacity as bankruptcy appellate 
court, we apply the clear error standard to a bankruptcy court's findings of fact 
and the de novo standard to its conclusions of law. See Phillips v. White (In re 
White), 25 F.3d931,933 (10th Cir. 1994). "A finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all of 
the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made/' Conoco, Inc. v. Styler (In re Peterson Distrib., Inc.), 82 F.3d 956, 
3
 HGC has also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Appendix to 
Reply Brief, which we grant. 
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959 (10th Cir. 1996). i;It is especially important to be faithful to the clearly 
erroneous standard when the bankruptcy court's findings have been upheld by the 
district court." Osborn v. Durant Bank & Trust Co., 24 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th 
Cir. 1994). Under Utah law, the existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a 
question of law which we review for "correctness." John Deere Co. v. A & H 
Equip.. Inc.. 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1994); see also Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. 
v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).4 "The burden of proving 
the existence of a contract is on the party seeking enforcement of it." Oberhanslv 
v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (citing B & R Supply Co v. 
Bringhurst. 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1972)). 
A 
The parties dispute whether their oral agreement of May 9, 1988 is an 
enforceable contract. "A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract 
is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, 
either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced."5 
4
 Contrary to Pride's assertions, the district court did not violate the clear 
error standard for review of the bankruptcy court's factual findings by holding 
that the May 9, 1988 agreement is unenforceable because, as noted, whether an 
enforceable contract exists is a question of law. 
5
 Because a condition precedent to the enforcement of an agreement is a 
finding of fact that there was a meeting of the minds sufficient to form an 
enforceable contract, the district court's holding that no enforceable contract 
(continued...) 
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Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). "[Contractual mutual assent 
requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their 
minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 
1050 (Utah 1978); see also Sackler v. Savin. 897 P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 
1995) (holding that to form an enforceable contract, there must be a meeting of 
the minds on the essential terms of the agreement). 
Normally, the intentions of the parties ''will be found from the instrument 
itself," but where, as here, the parties did not execute a written contract, "resort 
may be had to extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties." 
Oberhanslv. 572 P.2d at 1386. The focus of our inquiry is the oral discussion on 
May 9, 1988, during which Pride purportedly granted a license to allow HGC to 
construct the golf course on portions of Pride's property in exchange for a 
$185,000 loan. 
Based on its examination of the evidence of the oral agreement, the district 
court concluded that "[i]mportant material terms such as the funding date, 
interest rate, and payment schedule . . . were not determined at that time." (I 
Appellant's App. at 293.) Not only were important terms left open, but it is not 
even clear which property lease supported the proposed loan. HGC claims the 
5(. ..continued) 
existed is not, as Pride contends, surplusage to its decision. 
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loan related only to the Clark-Pride property, but Pride alleges the loan was 
supported by HGC's use of both the Clark-Pride and the fourteenth hole 
properties. If "there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract 
might be entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a 
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it." Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 
428-29 (citation omitted). We conclude this is the situation present here. 
Because the parties did not ultimately memorialize their oral agreement, we 
must inquire beyond the verbal discussions into the attempts at written 
documentation. The aforementioned letter of commitment regarding the 
fourteenth hole property was signed by Pride and stated in relevant part: 
By this letter we indicate our commitment to granting to [HGC] an 
appropriate easement or license over the property . . . . The 
underlying agreements between the parties necessary to make such a 
commitment have been reached in principle and are awaiting final 
documentation, which is expected to be prepared and signed within 
the next two weeks. As such, we have no objection to the granting of 
a construction permit . . . . 
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) In addition, as detailed above, HGC prepared and 
sent to Pride a license agreement and a promissory note in the amount of 
$185,000 for the Clark-Pride property and prepared a separate license agreement 
for the fourteenth hole property. As we have noted, Pride did not sign either of 
the license agreements. The license agreements and the promissory note are of 
limited value in determining the parties' intent because they were never signed or 
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executed. Moreover, the letter of commitment did not specify the terms of the 
oral agreement and stated explicitly the parties' intent to document the details of 
their arrangement in writing at a later time. 
Conceding that no formal agreements "were ever signed by the parties," 
Pride nevertheless asserts that the missing material terms of the parties' 
agreement were actually contained in the record on appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 
18.) Condie, who was negotiating on behalf of Pride, testified that the terms of 
the loan, including the interest rate, the payback of the loan, and the purported 
use of the funds to gain forbearance from foreclosure, were discussed on May 9, 
1988, as well as the "dedication or use of [Pride's] property for the golf course" 
as a "condition of that loan." (II Appellant's App. at 382-85.) But this argument 
did not make it onto the green because Condie also testified that the "next 
step . . . after that meeting" was that "[t]he documents would be prepared to put 
into writing the understanding." (IdLat 387.) 
If the parties intend to negotiate further the terms of an agreement, a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into the agreement is only preliminary, and 
does not demonstrate the existence of a binding contract. See Sackler, 897 P.2d 
at 1221-22. For example, in Crimson v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 
1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a letter indicated that "the parties were still 
negotiating . . . [, defendant's] legal department would be sending a prepared 
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lease[, and] . . . both parties understood that a binding contract would be entered 
into in the future." The parties then exchanged proposed leases, which the Utah 
Court of Appeals held "clearly demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of 
the minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease/' Id^at 1222. In the instant 
case, the letter of commitment evidences that same intention—to prepare written 
documentation of the parties' understanding which would then constitute the 
binding contract. That intention was precisely what the bankruptcy court found: 
'The parties intended that their agreement be reduced to writing and executed." 
(I Appellant's App. at 273.) HGC drafted this documentation, but Pride did not 
sign it. All that the parties consummated on May 9, 1988 was an agreement to 
agree, which is "unenforceable because [it] leave[s] open material terms for 
future consideration, and the courts cannot create these terms for the parties." 
Harmon v. Greenwood. 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) (citing 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
362 Contracts § 26 (1991)) (further citations omitted)). 
Notwithstanding uncertainty regarding the terms of the loan, Pride argues 
that the terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for 
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1979). But this argument lands Pride 
in a bunker: Like the district court, we are at a loss to determine what that 
remedy would be, because we are unable to determine the rights of the respective 
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parties under the agreement.6 As explained by the district court, "[t]he record 
does not indicate which party was to perform first . . . [or] what the required 
performance was: Did the agreement call for Pride to sign the promissory note 
and obtain licenses before the loan would be funded, as HGC suggests, or was 
HGC to fund the loan first before obtaining either the licenses or 
subordinations?" (I Appellant's App. at 292.) Furthermore, the complaint at 
issue sought a declaration of rights pertaining to the fourteenth hole property, but 
the parties dispute whether the oral loan agreement related to that property or, as 
HGC contends, related only to the Clark-Pride property.7 We will not speculate 
as to the parties' intentions regarding a lease or easement for the fourteenth hole 
property. Where, as here, we cannot determine what the rights of the parties 
6
 Pre-trial orders measure the dimensions of the lawsuit, both in the trial 
court and on appeal. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
551 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1977). Pride asserts for the first time in its reply 
brief that we are bound by the parties' stipulation in the pre-trial order that u[o]n 
or about May 9, 1988 [HGC] and [Pride] orally agreed that [HGC] would lend 
[Pride] the sum of $185,000 so that [Pride] could make payment to certain of its 
creditors." (I Appellant's App. at 183-84.) The district court's holding that the 
oral agreement is not sufficiently definite to form a contract is not contrary to 
this stipulation. 
7
 Because the scope of the complaint and subsequent findings of the 
bankruptcy court are limited to the fourteenth hole property, we do not address 
whether the parties entered into an agreement or contract relative to the Clark-
Pride property. Our decision therefore does not preclude any pending or future 
actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride property. 
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would be under an agreement, we cannot enforce that agreement.8 See 
Oberhanslv. 572 P.2d at 1387. 
8
 Pride claims that it is entitled to a finding of an enforceable contract 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), which states in relevant part that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled." This claim is without merit because the district court has the authority 
to affirm the bankruptcy court's decision on an alternative ground supported by 
the record. See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th 
Cir. 1993). Likewise, Pride's reliance in its reply brief on Brown v. Gurney, 201 
U.S. 184, 190 (1906), is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Brown held that 
"where the existence of certain facts is assumed in the trial court and the trial 
proceeds, without objection, on that assumption, and the case is decided in 
reliance thereon, neither party will be heard in the court of review to 
question . . . the existence of the facts." However, the instant case is 
distinguishable because whether the agreement constitutes an enforceable 
contract is a question of law, not of fact. 
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B 
Pride would have us ignore the missing elements in its documentation that 
make the contract unenforceable by arguing that it fully performed in allowing 
HGC to construct its golf course, but that HGC refused to fund the loan knowing 
that failure to do so could result in foreclosure on Pride's property. According to 
Pride, allowing HGC to retain the benefit of the bargain, while denying Pride the 
opportunity to recover the damages it incurred due to HGC's breach of the 
agreement on the grounds of indefmiteness, would be inequitable.9 
Pride tees its argument on 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 193 (1991): 
The determination that an agreement is sufficiently definite is 
favored. Rejection of a contract for indefmiteness is, at best, a last 
resort. Therefore, courts will, if possible, so construe the agreement 
as to carry into effect the reasonable intention of the parties, if that 
can be ascertained. In other words, in interpreting doubtful 
agreements a court will, if possible, attach a sufficiently definite 
meaning to a bargain of parties who evidently intended to enter into 
a binding contract. The law leans against the destruction of 
contracts for uncertainty, particularly where one of the parties has 
performed part of the contract. 
9
 We do not address the merits of Pride's reply brief contention that it is 
entitled to relief pursuant to the doctrines enunciated in Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§ 34 and 69(2) (1979). See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust. 994 
F.2d 716, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that issues raised for the first time in the 
reply brief will not be considered). Ordinarily, detrimental reliance might allow 
a remedy where no formal contract exists, or, alternatively, partial performance 
such as occurred here might support a finding of an enforceable contract. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34 (1979). Pride, however, did not advance 
arguments based on these theories until its reply brief, although it did place in 
play the doctrinally independent concept of equitable estoppel. 
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Pride contends that even if the oral agreement in its original conception was 
unenforceable, the fact that HGC acted on this agreement by constructing the golf 
course, in addition to fronting Pride Stables $5,000 of the agreed-on $185,000 
loan, constitutes an acceptance of the bargain.10 
It is true that HGC began construction of the course in June 1988 and gave 
Condie a check in the amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and Crossland the 
following month. It is also true that "conduct by one party which leads another 
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct" may constitute 
equitable estoppel. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 
(Utah 1985). But Pride fails to drive the point home, because vta mere promise to 
execute a written contract and a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to 
create an estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is 
sustained as a consequence of the refusal." F.C. Stangh III v. Ernst Home Ctr., 
Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting McKinnon v. The Corp. 
10
 As an alternative basis for finding injury, Pride argues that Lem Stroud, 
who negotiated on behalf of HGC, admitted that he had a fiduciary duty and 
made representations to Pride that if it would contribute its property, it would be 
"morally, legally and otherwise protected in their dealings." (Appellant's Br. at 
17 (citing Appellant's App. at 333-34).) We do not consider this argument 
because Pride has utterly failed to support it with legal authority. See Phillips v. 
Calhoun. 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a party must 
support its argument with legal authority). 
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of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 
436-37 (Utah 1974)). Pride merely relied on HGC's promise to execute a written 
contract, which is insufficient to create an estoppel. 
C 
In its conclusion, the district court stated: "It appears that the loan 
agreement, as contemplated by the parties, more closely resembled a Monet—an 
impressionist rendering fashioned as the thoughts occurred to them—rather than 
a Manet of detailed execution." (I Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 11 (citing United 
States v. Cropper, 42 F.3d 755, 759 (2d Cir. 1994).) But it is the surreal nature 
of the parties' conduct that we find remarkable. As noted by the district court, 
"[w]hy any business would begin developing a golf course on land it had no 
ownership interest in, without first securing written permission to use the land on 
terms that required a definite performance and secured that interest, is beyond the 
comprehension of this Court." (I Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 8.) We fault the 
district court only in its choice of artistic metaphor—Impressionism rather than 
Surrealism—but otherwise take its view of the matter. 
VIII 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
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